The passage of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) by the British Parliament, completed the slow process of federation that had begun in the 1890s. The independent colonial administrations agreed to establish a national parliament. They adopted a system of government that meshed Westminster traditions of parliamentary government with US-inspired federalism. When Australia federated on 1 January 1901, the Governor-General commissioned a transitional Ministry; Edmund Barton became the first Prime Minister. The Cabinet was tasked with setting in place arrangements for an election in March 1901 and arranging the opening of the Parliament on 9 May 1901.

In the absence of an established bureaucracy, Thomas Bavin, became the Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary (PPS). Australia’s first PPS was a political appointee; a lawyer and committed Federationist. Bavin had strong ties to key ‘founding fathers’. He served as PPS to Edmund Barton and Alfred Deakin before returning to Sydney in 1904.

From 1904 until 1980 the ‘public service model’ was the norm. Following the model of the British Civil Service, promising officials were seconded to the PM’s private office - first from the Department of External Affairs (1904-1910) and later from the Prime Minister’s Department, established by Andrew Fisher in 1911. Their key tasks as PPS included providing administrative, clerical and sometimes political support to the prime minister. They had also responsible for a small team that gradually expanded to personal secretaries, typists and a press secretary.

Prior to 1972 there was limited personal staffing capacity for Australian prime ministers. Their primary source of support was the Prime Minister’s Department (1911-71), now the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), together with a small private office led by seconded departmental officer at PPS.

The Whitlam government was the first to challenge the PPS tradition. The new Prime Minister, Whitlam used his 1973 Garran Oration to assert the political executive’s primacy in policy-making. He challenged the traditional power of the Canberra mandarins, describing them as only one part of the system of advice and support to the Labor government.

Labor intended the PMO would become a policy powerhouse that would drive implementation of its election commitments and platform. It would appoint outsiders to ministerial offices, notably the PMO. The progenitor of Labor's reforms, Whitlam PPS, Peter Wilenski, envisaged that the infusion of young, well-educated advisers from outside the public service would provide ministers with support to deal with their departments; and be a source of independent advice.

In 1974 the Whitlam government commissioned a Royal commission into Australian government administration (RCAGA) under the chairmanship of HC ‘Nugget’ Coombs. By the time RCAGA completed its inquiry, however, the Whitlam government had been dismissed. The report was handed to a new prime minister, Malcolm Fraser.

While Fraser’s response to the commission's recommendations was generally favourable, his willingness and ability to pursue administrative reform was constrained. Weller and Smith (1977: 25) argue that in light of the circumstances facing the Fraser government, ‘it would be difficult to imagine an economic and political climate less suitable for any bureaucratic experiment that might require increased expenditure than the one that exists at the moment’.

In Opposition, Malcolm Fraser was highly critical of the Whitlam government's advisory arrangements. Dismayed by the Whitlam experience, he looked to the public service as the principal source of advice and support to his government. Ministerial staff were retained, although (at least initially), they were curtailed in size and functions except in the PMO.

Fraser brought with him to power a loyal staff developed in opposition. Like Whitlam, he enlisted the help of an academic, Dr David Kemp, a political scientist, to design the structure and functions of his PMO.

The 1980 election convinced Fraser of the benefits of a strong PMO and a politically appointed CoS. Kemp who had returned to academia in 1976, was invited to return as head to lead a restructure and upgrading of Fraser private office. Consistent with advice he had provided previously to Fraser, Kemp's job was primarily a political one, focused on supporting the leadership functions of the Prime Minister.

Former chiefs of staff believe the Fraser period marked a critical juncture in the development of the Chief of Staff job, because the rationale for the position was clearly articulated, forcefully argued and ultimately justified by public service intransigence. David Kemp has written about the extraordinary battle for control over the direction of policy between Fraser and his senior official advisers in the Treasury, the Department of Foreign affairs and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Labor carefully planned its transition to government in 1983. In Opposition, it extensively analysed the Whitlam government’s failings. It worked hard to prove it was fit to govern.

Hawke believed many of the issues the Whitlam government had encountered were a consequence of its poor relationships with the public service. Accordingly, he insisted an experienced public servant would lead his P.M.O.. All four Hawke CoS had significant public service experience; all later became departmental secretaries.

Hawke’s model was strongly premised on harnessing the complementary skills and capacities of the P.M.O. with the skills and expertise of the public service. He made clear he did not want to party political advice from the public servants in his office. He looked to them to ensure he received effective and balanced support, and that he received information and advice from the widest possible variety of sources.

The job of PM’s chief of staff evolved considerably under the Hawke government. Passage of the Members of Parliament Staff Act (1984) (the MoPS Act) and political management reforms to make the public service more responsive were decisive. The MoPS Act resolved some of the ambiguities and tensions about public servants’ involvement in partisan activities while seconded to ministerial offices.

Hawke’s P.M.O. was very much a reflection of the leader. As Prime Minister he encouraged an open office, welcoming frank advice and a diversity of views. He fostered good relationships with the Head of PM&C, Mike Codd and the senior public service who became partners in Labor’s agenda for economic and social reform, and reform of the public service.

From the early years of the Labor government, Paul Keating was one of its most senior figures, second only to the Prime Minister himself. Until leadership tension spilled over between them during 1991, Hawke and Keating had been the ideal political tandem. Their partnership underpinned Labor’s unprecedented electoral and policy success. When Keating became prime minister in December 1991, he inherited a government in crisis. It was desperate unpopular and lacking direction.

Keating’s more personal and centralist approach to leadership was a marked contrast to Hawke’s consultative and consensus-based style. Ministers criticised Keating for his failure to consult, his unwillingness to develop and observe ‘proper’ Cabinet process. Colleagues and senior officials resented his tendency to concentrate policy initiation and decision-making within a powerful and progressively more insular PMO and to delegate authority to senior staff, with whom he enjoyed close trusting relationships.

When John Howard became Prime Minister in March 1996, he inherited an advisory system in which the institutional resources available to the leader had been significantly enhanced. Ministerial staff had become much more significant actors than when Howard was a minister in the Fraser government.

Howard came to office with strong ideas about how he wanted to run his government. He proposed reforms to ensure Cabinet could function effectively in setting strategic direction and ensuring adherence to its policy priorities. During its years in Opposition, the Liberal Party devoted much time and effort to developing a cadre of professional, politically attuned and media savvy personal staff. It committed to greater reliance on these staff when next in government.

Much has been written about Kevin Rudd’s tumultuous period as Prime Minister. The experience continues to be interpreted and reinterpreted through the bitter partisan divisions that tore apart the previously successful partnership between Rudd and his Deputy, Julia Gillard, which underpinned Labor’s election victory in 2007 and its early period in government.

Rudd had two CoS in his twenty months in the PMO. Initially David Epstein, a veteran of the Hawke and Keating governments who had joined Rudd’s office in Opposition to help smooth the transition to government, served as CoS. He, and many other experienced senior staff left Rudd’s office during 2008 and 2009, reportedly exhausted by Rudd’s unrelenting demands and frustrated at their inability to influence the PM.

• Know the boss
• Run the office
• Be there tomorrow
• Focus on priorities
• Control the agenda
• Get the right people in the room
• Manage key dependencies
• Preserve institutional memory

“Pest Controller”: sympathetically listen to members seeking access to the prime minister, support for a politically important initiative or some form of preferment.

“Shock Absorber”: The CoS is the bearer of bad news and also, the person most likely to be on the receiving end of the prime minister’s displeasure – it requires a degree of resilience.

Anne Tiernan is an Associate Professor in the Centre for Governance and Public Policy and School of Government and Industrial Relations at Griffith University, Australia.

For more information about the author please visit http://www.annetiernan.com.au/.

"Pest Controller and Shock Absorber: 40 years of the Prime Ministers’ Chiefs of Staff" is a collaborative project created with Griffith University ePress.

Anne would like to thank: Chris Boyle, James Boyle, Michael Boyle, Shauna Farquhar, Sarah Lindsay, Darryl Marsh, Brian Short, Helen Rowe, and Rod Rhodes.