Pest Controller, Shock Absorber
40 Years of the Prime Ministers' Chiefs of Staff
Federation
Federation
Federation
Federation
1901
Federation
The passage of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) by the British Parliament, completed the slow process of federation that had begun in the 1890s. The independent colonial administrations agreed to establish a national parliament. They adopted a system of government that meshed Westminster traditions of parliamentary government with US-inspired federalism. When Australia federated on 1 January 1901, the Governor-General commissioned a transitional Ministry; Edmund Barton became the first Prime Minister. The Cabinet was tasked with setting in place arrangements for an election in March 1901 and arranging the opening of the Parliament on 9 May 1901.
Australia’s founders envisaged a modest role for the Commonwealth government. Its powers were enumerated in the Constitution. It was assumed all other powers would rest with the states. Just six departments were created when Australia federated on 1 January 1901. These were: Attorney-General’s, Defence, External Affairs, Home Affairs, Trade and Customs, and The Treasury.
Sir Robert Garran a lawyer who had been active in the Federation movement was briefly the Commonwealth’s only public servant. As Secretary of Attorney-General’s, Garran was responsible for administrative and legislative arrangements, including the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1902.
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Opening of the First Parliament
Tom Roberts, Opening of the First Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia by H.R.H. The Duke of Cornwall and York (Later King George V), May 9, 1901, 1903, oil on canvas.
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Thomas Bavin
1901
Federation
The passage of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) by the British Parliament, completed the slow process of federation that had begun in the 1890s. The independent colonial administrations agreed to establish a national parliament. They adopted a system of government that meshed Westminster traditions of parliamentary government with US-inspired federalism. When Australia federated on 1 January 1901, the Governor-General commissioned a transitional Ministry; Edmund Barton became the first Prime Minister. The Cabinet was tasked with setting in place arrangements for an election in March 1901 and arranging the opening of the Parliament on 9 May 1901.
Australia’s founders envisaged a modest role for the Commonwealth government. Its powers were enumerated in the Constitution. It was assumed all other powers would rest with the states. Just six departments were created when Australia federated on 1 January 1901. These were: Attorney-General’s, Defence, External Affairs, Home Affairs, Trade and Customs, and The Treasury.
Sir Robert Garran a lawyer who had been active in the Federation movement was briefly the Commonwealth’s only public servant. As Secretary of Attorney-General’s, Garran was responsible for administrative and legislative arrangements, including the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1902.
-
Opening of the First Parliament
Tom Roberts, Opening of the First Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia by H.R.H. The Duke of Cornwall and York (Later King George V), May 9, 1901, 1903, oil on canvas.
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Thomas Bavin
1901
Federation
The passage of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) by the British Parliament, completed the slow process of federation that had begun in the 1890s. The independent colonial administrations agreed to establish a national parliament. They adopted a system of government that meshed Westminster traditions of parliamentary government with US-inspired federalism. When Australia federated on 1 January 1901, the Governor-General commissioned a transitional Ministry; Edmund Barton became the first Prime Minister. The Cabinet was tasked with setting in place arrangements for an election in March 1901 and arranging the opening of the Parliament on 9 May 1901.
Australia’s founders envisaged a modest role for the Commonwealth government. Its powers were enumerated in the Constitution. It was assumed all other powers would rest with the states. Just six departments were created when Australia federated on 1 January 1901. These were: Attorney-General’s, Defence, External Affairs, Home Affairs, Trade and Customs, and The Treasury.
Sir Robert Garran a lawyer who had been active in the Federation movement was briefly the Commonwealth’s only public servant. As Secretary of Attorney-General’s, Garran was responsible for administrative and legislative arrangements, including the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1902.
-
Opening of the First Parliament
Tom Roberts, Opening of the First Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia by H.R.H. The Duke of Cornwall and York (Later King George V), May 9, 1901, 1903, oil on canvas.
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Thomas Bavin
1901
Federation
The passage of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) by the British Parliament, completed the slow process of federation that had begun in the 1890s. The independent colonial administrations agreed to establish a national parliament. They adopted a system of government that meshed Westminster traditions of parliamentary government with US-inspired federalism. When Australia federated on 1 January 1901, the Governor-General commissioned a transitional Ministry; Edmund Barton became the first Prime Minister. The Cabinet was tasked with setting in place arrangements for an election in March 1901 and arranging the opening of the Parliament on 9 May 1901.
Australia’s founders envisaged a modest role for the Commonwealth government. Its powers were enumerated in the Constitution. It was assumed all other powers would rest with the states. Just six departments were created when Australia federated on 1 January 1901. These were: Attorney-General’s, Defence, External Affairs, Home Affairs, Trade and Customs, and The Treasury.
Sir Robert Garran a lawyer who had been active in the Federation movement was briefly the Commonwealth’s only public servant. As Secretary of Attorney-General’s, Garran was responsible for administrative and legislative arrangements, including the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1902.
-
Opening of the First Parliament
Tom Roberts, Opening of the First Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia by H.R.H. The Duke of Cornwall and York (Later King George V), May 9, 1901, 1903, oil on canvas.
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Thomas Bavin
1904 - 1972
The Public Service Model
In the absence of an established bureaucracy, Thomas Bavin, became the Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary (PPS). Australia’s first PPS was a political appointee; a lawyer and committed Federationist. Bavin had strong ties to key ‘founding fathers’. He served as PPS to Edmund Barton and Alfred Deakin before returning to Sydney in 1904.
From 1904 until 1980 the ‘public service model’ was the norm. Following the model of the British Civil Service, promising officials were seconded to the PM’s private office - first from the Department of External Affairs (1904-1910) and later from the Prime Minister’s Department, established by Andrew Fisher in 1911. Their key tasks as PPS included providing administrative, clerical and sometimes political support to the prime minister. They had also responsible for a small team that gradually expanded to personal secretaries, typists and a press secretary.
In Australia as in Britain, the job of PPS was a proving ground for public service high-flyers. Some, like Malcolm Shepherd, Percy Deane and (later Sir) Geoffrey Yeend, went on to become Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department (Weller, Scott & Stevens 2011).
The ‘public service model’ came under pressure as prime minister’s sought greater responsiveness and political support. Gough Whitlam and Malcolm Fraser each attempted to redefine the work of the prime minister’s private office, but the shift towards more personalised appointments would come in Fraser’s second term.
1904 - 1972
The Public Service Model
In the absence of an established bureaucracy, Thomas Bavin, became the Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary (PPS). Australia’s first PPS was a political appointee; a lawyer and committed Federationist. Bavin had strong ties to key ‘founding fathers’. He served as PPS to Edmund Barton and Alfred Deakin before returning to Sydney in 1904.
From 1904 until 1980 the ‘public service model’ was the norm. Following the model of the British Civil Service, promising officials were seconded to the PM’s private office - first from the Department of External Affairs (1904-1910) and later from the Prime Minister’s Department, established by Andrew Fisher in 1911. Their key tasks as PPS included providing administrative, clerical and sometimes political support to the prime minister. They had also responsible for a small team that gradually expanded to personal secretaries, typists and a press secretary.
In Australia as in Britain, the job of PPS was a proving ground for public service high-flyers. Some, like Malcolm Shepherd, Percy Deane and (later Sir) Geoffrey Yeend, went on to become Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department (Weller, Scott & Stevens 2011).
The ‘public service model’ came under pressure as prime minister’s sought greater responsiveness and political support. Gough Whitlam and Malcolm Fraser each attempted to redefine the work of the prime minister’s private office, but the shift towards more personalised appointments would come in Fraser’s second term.
1904 - 1972
The Public Service Model
In the absence of an established bureaucracy, Thomas Bavin, became the Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary (PPS). Australia’s first PPS was a political appointee; a lawyer and committed Federationist. Bavin had strong ties to key ‘founding fathers’. He served as PPS to Edmund Barton and Alfred Deakin before returning to Sydney in 1904.
From 1904 until 1980 the ‘public service model’ was the norm. Following the model of the British Civil Service, promising officials were seconded to the PM’s private office - first from the Department of External Affairs (1904-1910) and later from the Prime Minister’s Department, established by Andrew Fisher in 1911. Their key tasks as PPS included providing administrative, clerical and sometimes political support to the prime minister. They had also responsible for a small team that gradually expanded to personal secretaries, typists and a press secretary.
In Australia as in Britain, the job of PPS was a proving ground for public service high-flyers. Some, like Malcolm Shepherd, Percy Deane and (later Sir) Geoffrey Yeend, went on to become Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department (Weller, Scott & Stevens 2011).
The ‘public service model’ came under pressure as prime minister’s sought greater responsiveness and political support. Gough Whitlam and Malcolm Fraser each attempted to redefine the work of the prime minister’s private office, but the shift towards more personalised appointments would come in Fraser’s second term.
1904 - 1972
The Public Service Model
In the absence of an established bureaucracy, Thomas Bavin, became the Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary (PPS). Australia’s first PPS was a political appointee; a lawyer and committed Federationist. Bavin had strong ties to key ‘founding fathers’. He served as PPS to Edmund Barton and Alfred Deakin before returning to Sydney in 1904.
From 1904 until 1980 the ‘public service model’ was the norm. Following the model of the British Civil Service, promising officials were seconded to the PM’s private office - first from the Department of External Affairs (1904-1910) and later from the Prime Minister’s Department, established by Andrew Fisher in 1911. Their key tasks as PPS included providing administrative, clerical and sometimes political support to the prime minister. They had also responsible for a small team that gradually expanded to personal secretaries, typists and a press secretary.
In Australia as in Britain, the job of PPS was a proving ground for public service high-flyers. Some, like Malcolm Shepherd, Percy Deane and (later Sir) Geoffrey Yeend, went on to become Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department (Weller, Scott & Stevens 2011).
The ‘public service model’ came under pressure as prime minister’s sought greater responsiveness and political support. Gough Whitlam and Malcolm Fraser each attempted to redefine the work of the prime minister’s private office, but the shift towards more personalised appointments would come in Fraser’s second term.
Stage 1
End of a Tradition
Stage 1
End of a Tradition
Stage 1
End of a Tradition
Stage 1
End of a Tradition
1972 - 1975
End of a Tradition
Prior to 1972 there was limited personal staffing capacity for Australian prime ministers. Their primary source of support was the Prime Minister’s Department (1911-71), now the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), together with a small private office led by seconded departmental officer at PPS.
The Whitlam government was the first to challenge the PPS tradition. The new Prime Minister, Whitlam used his 1973 Garran Oration to assert the political executive’s primacy in policy-making. He challenged the traditional power of the Canberra mandarins, describing them as only one part of the system of advice and support to the Labor government.
Labor intended the PMO would become a policy powerhouse that would drive implementation of its election commitments and platform. It would appoint outsiders to ministerial offices, notably the PMO. The progenitor of Labor's reforms, Whitlam PPS, Peter Wilenski, envisaged that the infusion of young, well-educated advisers from outside the public service would provide ministers with support to deal with their departments; and be a source of independent advice.
Though initially contentious, the experience of Whitlam's advisory innovations was mixed. Ultimately the Prime Minister recognised the need for greater coherence and administrative discipline. In his second term Whitlam relied more on the public service for coordination and control. He substantially upgraded the policy functions of PM&C; in October 1974 appointed his former PPS, John Menadue, as Permanent Head.
The immediate impact of Labor’s changes was limited during the government's short life, however, the long-term consequences of its advisory experiments were profound. Greater numbers of ministerial staff broadened the channels of advice to ministers, and brought the issue of political advice to public prominence.
The Whitlam years marked a watershed in executive-bureaucratic relations as ministers asserted their prerogative to engage their own sources of information and advice, and their expectations of greater responsiveness from the bureaucracy. Labor’s establishment of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA) set the framework for a much-needed debate about the role of the public service.
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Whitlam's Visit to the Philippines
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Whitlam Dismissal: Old Parliament House Footage
1972 - 1975
End of a Tradition
Prior to 1972 there was limited personal staffing capacity for Australian prime ministers. Their primary source of support was the Prime Minister’s Department (1911-71), now the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), together with a small private office led by seconded departmental officer at PPS.
The Whitlam government was the first to challenge the PPS tradition. The new Prime Minister, Whitlam used his 1973 Garran Oration to assert the political executive’s primacy in policy-making. He challenged the traditional power of the Canberra mandarins, describing them as only one part of the system of advice and support to the Labor government.
Labor intended the PMO would become a policy powerhouse that would drive implementation of its election commitments and platform. It would appoint outsiders to ministerial offices, notably the PMO. The progenitor of Labor's reforms, Whitlam PPS, Peter Wilenski, envisaged that the infusion of young, well-educated advisers from outside the public service would provide ministers with support to deal with their departments; and be a source of independent advice.
Though initially contentious, the experience of Whitlam's advisory innovations was mixed. Ultimately the Prime Minister recognised the need for greater coherence and administrative discipline. In his second term Whitlam relied more on the public service for coordination and control. He substantially upgraded the policy functions of PM&C; in October 1974 appointed his former PPS, John Menadue, as Permanent Head.
The immediate impact of Labor’s changes was limited during the government's short life, however, the long-term consequences of its advisory experiments were profound. Greater numbers of ministerial staff broadened the channels of advice to ministers, and brought the issue of political advice to public prominence.
The Whitlam years marked a watershed in executive-bureaucratic relations as ministers asserted their prerogative to engage their own sources of information and advice, and their expectations of greater responsiveness from the bureaucracy. Labor’s establishment of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA) set the framework for a much-needed debate about the role of the public service.
-
Whitlam's Visit to the Philippines
-
Whitlam Dismissal: Old Parliament House Footage
1972 - 1975
End of a Tradition
Prior to 1972 there was limited personal staffing capacity for Australian prime ministers. Their primary source of support was the Prime Minister’s Department (1911-71), now the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), together with a small private office led by seconded departmental officer at PPS.
The Whitlam government was the first to challenge the PPS tradition. The new Prime Minister, Whitlam used his 1973 Garran Oration to assert the political executive’s primacy in policy-making. He challenged the traditional power of the Canberra mandarins, describing them as only one part of the system of advice and support to the Labor government.
Labor intended the PMO would become a policy powerhouse that would drive implementation of its election commitments and platform. It would appoint outsiders to ministerial offices, notably the PMO. The progenitor of Labor's reforms, Whitlam PPS, Peter Wilenski, envisaged that the infusion of young, well-educated advisers from outside the public service would provide ministers with support to deal with their departments; and be a source of independent advice.
Though initially contentious, the experience of Whitlam's advisory innovations was mixed. Ultimately the Prime Minister recognised the need for greater coherence and administrative discipline. In his second term Whitlam relied more on the public service for coordination and control. He substantially upgraded the policy functions of PM&C; in October 1974 appointed his former PPS, John Menadue, as Permanent Head.
The immediate impact of Labor’s changes was limited during the government's short life, however, the long-term consequences of its advisory experiments were profound. Greater numbers of ministerial staff broadened the channels of advice to ministers, and brought the issue of political advice to public prominence.
The Whitlam years marked a watershed in executive-bureaucratic relations as ministers asserted their prerogative to engage their own sources of information and advice, and their expectations of greater responsiveness from the bureaucracy. Labor’s establishment of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA) set the framework for a much-needed debate about the role of the public service.
-
Whitlam's Visit to the Philippines
-
Whitlam Dismissal: Old Parliament House Footage
1972 - 1975
End of a Tradition
Prior to 1972 there was limited personal staffing capacity for Australian prime ministers. Their primary source of support was the Prime Minister’s Department (1911-71), now the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), together with a small private office led by seconded departmental officer at PPS.
The Whitlam government was the first to challenge the PPS tradition. The new Prime Minister, Whitlam used his 1973 Garran Oration to assert the political executive’s primacy in policy-making. He challenged the traditional power of the Canberra mandarins, describing them as only one part of the system of advice and support to the Labor government.
Labor intended the PMO would become a policy powerhouse that would drive implementation of its election commitments and platform. It would appoint outsiders to ministerial offices, notably the PMO. The progenitor of Labor's reforms, Whitlam PPS, Peter Wilenski, envisaged that the infusion of young, well-educated advisers from outside the public service would provide ministers with support to deal with their departments; and be a source of independent advice.
Though initially contentious, the experience of Whitlam's advisory innovations was mixed. Ultimately the Prime Minister recognised the need for greater coherence and administrative discipline. In his second term Whitlam relied more on the public service for coordination and control. He substantially upgraded the policy functions of PM&C; in October 1974 appointed his former PPS, John Menadue, as Permanent Head.
The immediate impact of Labor’s changes was limited during the government's short life, however, the long-term consequences of its advisory experiments were profound. Greater numbers of ministerial staff broadened the channels of advice to ministers, and brought the issue of political advice to public prominence.
The Whitlam years marked a watershed in executive-bureaucratic relations as ministers asserted their prerogative to engage their own sources of information and advice, and their expectations of greater responsiveness from the bureaucracy. Labor’s establishment of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA) set the framework for a much-needed debate about the role of the public service.
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Whitlam's Visit to the Philippines
-
Whitlam Dismissal: Old Parliament House Footage
1974 - 1976
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration
In 1974 the Whitlam government commissioned a Royal commission into Australian government administration (RCAGA) under the chairmanship of HC ‘Nugget’ Coombs. By the time RCAGA completed its inquiry, however, the Whitlam government had been dismissed. The report was handed to a new prime minister, Malcolm Fraser.
While Fraser’s response to the commission's recommendations was generally favourable, his willingness and ability to pursue administrative reform was constrained. Weller and Smith (1977: 25) argue that in light of the circumstances facing the Fraser government, ‘it would be difficult to imagine an economic and political climate less suitable for any bureaucratic experiment that might require increased expenditure than the one that exists at the moment’.
RCAGA’s consideration of the role of ministerial staff took place in the context of significant debate about the proper role and function and amidst uncertainty over whether the expansion of ministers’ personal staffs would continue in future (for a detailed account see Tiernan (2007: 45-46).
RCAGA’s findings have had long-term implications for Australian government and in particular, the Australian Public Service (APS). Its report was a catalyst for public sector reforms of the subsequent decades that ushered in greater ministerial control, expectations of public service responsiveness and reform of public sector employment arrangements, including an emphasis on equity and merit in selection and promotion.
1974 - 1976
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration
In 1974 the Whitlam government commissioned a Royal commission into Australian government administration (RCAGA) under the chairmanship of HC ‘Nugget’ Coombs. By the time RCAGA completed its inquiry, however, the Whitlam government had been dismissed. The report was handed to a new prime minister, Malcolm Fraser.
While Fraser’s response to the commission's recommendations was generally favourable, his willingness and ability to pursue administrative reform was constrained. Weller and Smith (1977: 25) argue that in light of the circumstances facing the Fraser government, ‘it would be difficult to imagine an economic and political climate less suitable for any bureaucratic experiment that might require increased expenditure than the one that exists at the moment’.
RCAGA’s consideration of the role of ministerial staff took place in the context of significant debate about the proper role and function and amidst uncertainty over whether the expansion of ministers’ personal staffs would continue in future (for a detailed account see Tiernan (2007: 45-46).
RCAGA’s findings have had long-term implications for Australian government and in particular, the Australian Public Service (APS). Its report was a catalyst for public sector reforms of the subsequent decades that ushered in greater ministerial control, expectations of public service responsiveness and reform of public sector employment arrangements, including an emphasis on equity and merit in selection and promotion.
1974 - 1976
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration
In 1974 the Whitlam government commissioned a Royal commission into Australian government administration (RCAGA) under the chairmanship of HC ‘Nugget’ Coombs. By the time RCAGA completed its inquiry, however, the Whitlam government had been dismissed. The report was handed to a new prime minister, Malcolm Fraser.
While Fraser’s response to the commission's recommendations was generally favourable, his willingness and ability to pursue administrative reform was constrained. Weller and Smith (1977: 25) argue that in light of the circumstances facing the Fraser government, ‘it would be difficult to imagine an economic and political climate less suitable for any bureaucratic experiment that might require increased expenditure than the one that exists at the moment’.
RCAGA’s consideration of the role of ministerial staff took place in the context of significant debate about the proper role and function and amidst uncertainty over whether the expansion of ministers’ personal staffs would continue in future (for a detailed account see Tiernan (2007: 45-46).
RCAGA’s findings have had long-term implications for Australian government and in particular, the Australian Public Service (APS). Its report was a catalyst for public sector reforms of the subsequent decades that ushered in greater ministerial control, expectations of public service responsiveness and reform of public sector employment arrangements, including an emphasis on equity and merit in selection and promotion.
1974 - 1976
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration
In 1974 the Whitlam government commissioned a Royal commission into Australian government administration (RCAGA) under the chairmanship of HC ‘Nugget’ Coombs. By the time RCAGA completed its inquiry, however, the Whitlam government had been dismissed. The report was handed to a new prime minister, Malcolm Fraser.
While Fraser’s response to the commission's recommendations was generally favourable, his willingness and ability to pursue administrative reform was constrained. Weller and Smith (1977: 25) argue that in light of the circumstances facing the Fraser government, ‘it would be difficult to imagine an economic and political climate less suitable for any bureaucratic experiment that might require increased expenditure than the one that exists at the moment’.
RCAGA’s consideration of the role of ministerial staff took place in the context of significant debate about the proper role and function and amidst uncertainty over whether the expansion of ministers’ personal staffs would continue in future (for a detailed account see Tiernan (2007: 45-46).
RCAGA’s findings have had long-term implications for Australian government and in particular, the Australian Public Service (APS). Its report was a catalyst for public sector reforms of the subsequent decades that ushered in greater ministerial control, expectations of public service responsiveness and reform of public sector employment arrangements, including an emphasis on equity and merit in selection and promotion.
Stage 2
In Transition
Stage 2
In Transition
Stage 2
In Transition
Stage 2
In Transition
1975 - 1980
In Transition
In Opposition, Malcolm Fraser was highly critical of the Whitlam government's advisory arrangements. Dismayed by the Whitlam experience, he looked to the public service as the principal source of advice and support to his government. Ministerial staff were retained, although (at least initially), they were curtailed in size and functions except in the PMO.
Fraser brought with him to power a loyal staff developed in opposition. Like Whitlam, he enlisted the help of an academic, Dr David Kemp, a political scientist, to design the structure and functions of his PMO.
In office, Fraser’s decision to retain an extensive private office staff was vindicated. The combination of personal style, a formidable private office and an expanded Department of PM&C enabled Fraser to achieve policy dominance. His advisory infrastructure evolved during his term in office. Unhappy with the quality of advice he received from Treasury, and determined to curtail its power, Fraser split the Treasury in December 1976. He broadened his sources of independent advice by strengthening PMC and recruiting expert advisers to his PMO, many from academic backgrounds.
- Dale Budd
Name: Dale Budd, OBE.
DoB: 4 April 1944
Age at Appointment: 31
Dates of Service: 1975 – 78
Number of Staff in PMO: Unavailable.
Education: B Engineering, University of Sydney
Previous Experience: Engineer; Private Secretary to Ministers, Public Servant, Consultant, Principal Private Secretary to Opposition Leader.
Post CoS Career: Prime Ministerial staffer, Consultant, Company Director.
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The Hilton Bombing
Venue for CHOGRM - Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting - 12.40 am on February 13, 1978 @ 488 GEORGE STREET, SYDNEY
1975 - 1980
In Transition
In Opposition, Malcolm Fraser was highly critical of the Whitlam government's advisory arrangements. Dismayed by the Whitlam experience, he looked to the public service as the principal source of advice and support to his government. Ministerial staff were retained, although (at least initially), they were curtailed in size and functions except in the PMO.
Fraser brought with him to power a loyal staff developed in opposition. Like Whitlam, he enlisted the help of an academic, Dr David Kemp, a political scientist, to design the structure and functions of his PMO.
In office, Fraser’s decision to retain an extensive private office staff was vindicated. The combination of personal style, a formidable private office and an expanded Department of PM&C enabled Fraser to achieve policy dominance. His advisory infrastructure evolved during his term in office. Unhappy with the quality of advice he received from Treasury, and determined to curtail its power, Fraser split the Treasury in December 1976. He broadened his sources of independent advice by strengthening PMC and recruiting expert advisers to his PMO, many from academic backgrounds.
- Dale Budd
Name: Dale Budd, OBE.
DoB: 4 April 1944
Age at Appointment: 31
Dates of Service: 1975 – 78
Number of Staff in PMO: Unavailable.
Education: B Engineering, University of Sydney
Previous Experience: Engineer; Private Secretary to Ministers, Public Servant, Consultant, Principal Private Secretary to Opposition Leader.
Post CoS Career: Prime Ministerial staffer, Consultant, Company Director.
-
The Hilton Bombing
Venue for CHOGRM - Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting - 12.40 am on February 13, 1978 @ 488 GEORGE STREET, SYDNEY
1975 - 1980
In Transition
In Opposition, Malcolm Fraser was highly critical of the Whitlam government's advisory arrangements. Dismayed by the Whitlam experience, he looked to the public service as the principal source of advice and support to his government. Ministerial staff were retained, although (at least initially), they were curtailed in size and functions except in the PMO.
Fraser brought with him to power a loyal staff developed in opposition. Like Whitlam, he enlisted the help of an academic, Dr David Kemp, a political scientist, to design the structure and functions of his PMO.
In office, Fraser’s decision to retain an extensive private office staff was vindicated. The combination of personal style, a formidable private office and an expanded Department of PM&C enabled Fraser to achieve policy dominance. His advisory infrastructure evolved during his term in office. Unhappy with the quality of advice he received from Treasury, and determined to curtail its power, Fraser split the Treasury in December 1976. He broadened his sources of independent advice by strengthening PMC and recruiting expert advisers to his PMO, many from academic backgrounds.
- Dale Budd
Name: Dale Budd, OBE.
DoB: 4 April 1944
Age at Appointment: 31
Dates of Service: 1975 – 78
Number of Staff in PMO: Unavailable.
Education: B Engineering, University of Sydney
Previous Experience: Engineer; Private Secretary to Ministers, Public Servant, Consultant, Principal Private Secretary to Opposition Leader.
Post CoS Career: Prime Ministerial staffer, Consultant, Company Director.
-
The Hilton Bombing
Venue for CHOGRM - Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting - 12.40 am on February 13, 1978 @ 488 GEORGE STREET, SYDNEY
1975 - 1980
In Transition
In Opposition, Malcolm Fraser was highly critical of the Whitlam government's advisory arrangements. Dismayed by the Whitlam experience, he looked to the public service as the principal source of advice and support to his government. Ministerial staff were retained, although (at least initially), they were curtailed in size and functions except in the PMO.
Fraser brought with him to power a loyal staff developed in opposition. Like Whitlam, he enlisted the help of an academic, Dr David Kemp, a political scientist, to design the structure and functions of his PMO.
In office, Fraser’s decision to retain an extensive private office staff was vindicated. The combination of personal style, a formidable private office and an expanded Department of PM&C enabled Fraser to achieve policy dominance. His advisory infrastructure evolved during his term in office. Unhappy with the quality of advice he received from Treasury, and determined to curtail its power, Fraser split the Treasury in December 1976. He broadened his sources of independent advice by strengthening PMC and recruiting expert advisers to his PMO, many from academic backgrounds.
- Dale Budd
Name: Dale Budd, OBE.
DoB: 4 April 1944
Age at Appointment: 31
Dates of Service: 1975 – 78
Number of Staff in PMO: Unavailable.
Education: B Engineering, University of Sydney
Previous Experience: Engineer; Private Secretary to Ministers, Public Servant, Consultant, Principal Private Secretary to Opposition Leader.
Post CoS Career: Prime Ministerial staffer, Consultant, Company Director.
-
The Hilton Bombing
Venue for CHOGRM - Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting - 12.40 am on February 13, 1978 @ 488 GEORGE STREET, SYDNEY
Stage 3
Supporting the PM
Stage 3
Supporting the PM
Stage 3
Supporting the PM
Stage 3
Supporting the PM
1980 - 1983
Supporting the PM
The 1980 election convinced Fraser of the benefits of a strong PMO and a politically appointed CoS. Kemp who had returned to academia in 1976, was invited to return as head to lead a restructure and upgrading of Fraser private office. Consistent with advice he had provided previously to Fraser, Kemp's job was primarily a political one, focused on supporting the leadership functions of the Prime Minister.
Former chiefs of staff believe the Fraser period marked a critical juncture in the development of the Chief of Staff job, because the rationale for the position was clearly articulated, forcefully argued and ultimately justified by public service intransigence. David Kemp has written about the extraordinary battle for control over the direction of policy between Fraser and his senior official advisers in the Treasury, the Department of Foreign affairs and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
Fraser wanted to drive policy from the centre. If he could not get support from the public service he would do it himself. Although Fraser had come to office ambivalent about the utility of ministerial staff and mindful of the dangers, he created a PMO that would serve as a significant resource for subsequent governments.
Fraser’s decisions about the design of the Prime Minister's office in the new Parliament House were also crucial in creating precedents for his prime ministerial successors. Where in the old building staff numbers in the PMO were constrained by a lack of space, the new building was designed to allow the Prime Minister a range of advisers within easy reach.
- David Kemp
Name: Professor David Kemp
D.O.B: 14 October, 1944
Age of Appointment: 39
Years of Service: 1980 - 81
Number of Staff: Unavailable
Education: BA/LLB, University of Melbourne, PhD., Yale
Previous Experience:Professor, Consultant Speechwriter for Leader of the Opposition; Senior Advisor, Leader of the Opposition.
Post CoS Career: Professor, Member for Goldstein, Professorial Fellow
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1983 Federal Election: Malcolm Fraser Concedes
1980 - 1983
Supporting the PM
The 1980 election convinced Fraser of the benefits of a strong PMO and a politically appointed CoS. Kemp who had returned to academia in 1976, was invited to return as head to lead a restructure and upgrading of Fraser private office. Consistent with advice he had provided previously to Fraser, Kemp's job was primarily a political one, focused on supporting the leadership functions of the Prime Minister.
Former chiefs of staff believe the Fraser period marked a critical juncture in the development of the Chief of Staff job, because the rationale for the position was clearly articulated, forcefully argued and ultimately justified by public service intransigence. David Kemp has written about the extraordinary battle for control over the direction of policy between Fraser and his senior official advisers in the Treasury, the Department of Foreign affairs and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
Fraser wanted to drive policy from the centre. If he could not get support from the public service he would do it himself. Although Fraser had come to office ambivalent about the utility of ministerial staff and mindful of the dangers, he created a PMO that would serve as a significant resource for subsequent governments.
Fraser’s decisions about the design of the Prime Minister's office in the new Parliament House were also crucial in creating precedents for his prime ministerial successors. Where in the old building staff numbers in the PMO were constrained by a lack of space, the new building was designed to allow the Prime Minister a range of advisers within easy reach.
- David Kemp
Name: Professor David Kemp
D.O.B: 14 October, 1944
Age of Appointment: 39
Years of Service: 1980 - 81
Number of Staff: Unavailable
Education: BA/LLB, University of Melbourne, PhD., Yale
Previous Experience:Professor, Consultant Speechwriter for Leader of the Opposition; Senior Advisor, Leader of the Opposition.
Post CoS Career: Professor, Member for Goldstein, Professorial Fellow
-
-
1983 Federal Election: Malcolm Fraser Concedes
1980 - 1983
Supporting the PM
The 1980 election convinced Fraser of the benefits of a strong PMO and a politically appointed CoS. Kemp who had returned to academia in 1976, was invited to return as head to lead a restructure and upgrading of Fraser private office. Consistent with advice he had provided previously to Fraser, Kemp's job was primarily a political one, focused on supporting the leadership functions of the Prime Minister.
Former chiefs of staff believe the Fraser period marked a critical juncture in the development of the Chief of Staff job, because the rationale for the position was clearly articulated, forcefully argued and ultimately justified by public service intransigence. David Kemp has written about the extraordinary battle for control over the direction of policy between Fraser and his senior official advisers in the Treasury, the Department of Foreign affairs and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
Fraser wanted to drive policy from the centre. If he could not get support from the public service he would do it himself. Although Fraser had come to office ambivalent about the utility of ministerial staff and mindful of the dangers, he created a PMO that would serve as a significant resource for subsequent governments.
Fraser’s decisions about the design of the Prime Minister's office in the new Parliament House were also crucial in creating precedents for his prime ministerial successors. Where in the old building staff numbers in the PMO were constrained by a lack of space, the new building was designed to allow the Prime Minister a range of advisers within easy reach.
- David Kemp
Name: Professor David Kemp
D.O.B: 14 October, 1944
Age of Appointment: 39
Years of Service: 1980 - 81
Number of Staff: Unavailable
Education: BA/LLB, University of Melbourne, PhD., Yale
Previous Experience:Professor, Consultant Speechwriter for Leader of the Opposition; Senior Advisor, Leader of the Opposition.
Post CoS Career: Professor, Member for Goldstein, Professorial Fellow
-
-
1983 Federal Election: Malcolm Fraser Concedes
1980 - 1983
Supporting the PM
The 1980 election convinced Fraser of the benefits of a strong PMO and a politically appointed CoS. Kemp who had returned to academia in 1976, was invited to return as head to lead a restructure and upgrading of Fraser private office. Consistent with advice he had provided previously to Fraser, Kemp's job was primarily a political one, focused on supporting the leadership functions of the Prime Minister.
Former chiefs of staff believe the Fraser period marked a critical juncture in the development of the Chief of Staff job, because the rationale for the position was clearly articulated, forcefully argued and ultimately justified by public service intransigence. David Kemp has written about the extraordinary battle for control over the direction of policy between Fraser and his senior official advisers in the Treasury, the Department of Foreign affairs and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
Fraser wanted to drive policy from the centre. If he could not get support from the public service he would do it himself. Although Fraser had come to office ambivalent about the utility of ministerial staff and mindful of the dangers, he created a PMO that would serve as a significant resource for subsequent governments.
Fraser’s decisions about the design of the Prime Minister's office in the new Parliament House were also crucial in creating precedents for his prime ministerial successors. Where in the old building staff numbers in the PMO were constrained by a lack of space, the new building was designed to allow the Prime Minister a range of advisers within easy reach.
- David Kemp
Name: Professor David Kemp
D.O.B: 14 October, 1944
Age of Appointment: 39
Years of Service: 1980 - 81
Number of Staff: Unavailable
Education: BA/LLB, University of Melbourne, PhD., Yale
Previous Experience:Professor, Consultant Speechwriter for Leader of the Opposition; Senior Advisor, Leader of the Opposition.
Post CoS Career: Professor, Member for Goldstein, Professorial Fellow
-
-
1983 Federal Election: Malcolm Fraser Concedes
Stage 4
In tandem
Stage 4
In tandem
Stage 4
In tandem
Stage 4
In tandem
1983 - 1991
In tandem
Labor carefully planned its transition to government in 1983. In Opposition, it extensively analysed the Whitlam government’s failings. It worked hard to prove it was fit to govern.
Hawke believed many of the issues the Whitlam government had encountered were a consequence of its poor relationships with the public service. Accordingly, he insisted an experienced public servant would lead his P.M.O.. All four Hawke CoS had significant public service experience; all later became departmental secretaries.
Hawke’s model was strongly premised on harnessing the complementary skills and capacities of the P.M.O. with the skills and expertise of the public service. He made clear he did not want to party political advice from the public servants in his office. He looked to them to ensure he received effective and balanced support, and that he received information and advice from the widest possible variety of sources.
The job of PM’s chief of staff evolved considerably under the Hawke government. Passage of the Members of Parliament Staff Act (1984) (the MoPS Act) and political management reforms to make the public service more responsive were decisive. The MoPS Act resolved some of the ambiguities and tensions about public servants’ involvement in partisan activities while seconded to ministerial offices.
Hawke’s P.M.O. was very much a reflection of the leader. As Prime Minister he encouraged an open office, welcoming frank advice and a diversity of views. He fostered good relationships with the Head of PM&C, Mike Codd and the senior public service who became partners in Labor’s agenda for economic and social reform, and reform of the public service.
Hawke was disciplined with his time and efficient with his paperwork; he liked order, structure and process. This, and the sense of purpose that characterised Hawke’s government, bred strong staff loyalty. His ‘model’, with its emphasis on due process, consultation with Cabinet colleagues and good relationships with the public service, is often cited as an exemplar.
In 1988, the strenuous parliament relocated from its temporary accommodation to the new Parliament house on Capital Hill. Many lamented the shift, noting the physical space restrictions on the old building promoted better relationships between ministers and other parliamentarians, with the public service and the media.
The collaborative and complementary relationship that existed between Hawke’s office and the public service was challenged by this altered ‘geography of influence’. The intimacy of the old building was lost; with security cards required to access the ministerial wing, there was greater formality gaining access to the prime minister and his staff.
For the chief of staff these arrangements made regulating access to the Prime Minister much easier. There were other benefits: quite simply the new building was a better a working environment for the Prime Minister's staff. The increase in space made it possible to appoint more specialists and to provide secretarial and administrative support to alleviate the demands on senior staff.
The growth in staff numbers more generally, but particularly in the P.M.O. expanded the coordination challenges increased, as did the leadership and management responsibilities of the chief of staff. As head of the P.M.O., the CoS now also assumed responsibility for personnel management and performance across government.
- Graham Evans
Name: Graham Evans AO
DoB: 22 January, 1943.
Age at Appointment: 40
Dates of Service: 1983 – 86.
Number of Staff in PMO: 16
Education: BA (Hons), MA University of Melbourne, M International Policy, Johns Hopkins University.
Previous Experience: Public Servant (Treasury), Diplomat (DFAT).
Post CoS Career: Departmental Secretary; Vice President of External Affairs, BHP Billiton; Chair, Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission.
- David ‘Sandy’ Holloway
Name: David ‘Sandy’ Holloway
DoB: 19 November, 1947.
Age at Appointment: 41
Dates of Service: 1988 – 90.
Number of Staff in PMO: 17
Education: BA (Hons), University of Sydney.
Previous Experience: Diplomat (DFAT), Public Servant (PM & C).
Post CoS Career: Deputy Secretary (PM & C); Departmental Secretary (DIST & DEETYA); CEO, Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG); Consultant; Special Envoy (Kokoda and Whale Conservation).
-
1983 - 1991
In tandem
Labor carefully planned its transition to government in 1983. In Opposition, it extensively analysed the Whitlam government’s failings. It worked hard to prove it was fit to govern.
Hawke believed many of the issues the Whitlam government had encountered were a consequence of its poor relationships with the public service. Accordingly, he insisted an experienced public servant would lead his P.M.O.. All four Hawke CoS had significant public service experience; all later became departmental secretaries.
Hawke’s model was strongly premised on harnessing the complementary skills and capacities of the P.M.O. with the skills and expertise of the public service. He made clear he did not want to party political advice from the public servants in his office. He looked to them to ensure he received effective and balanced support, and that he received information and advice from the widest possible variety of sources.
The job of PM’s chief of staff evolved considerably under the Hawke government. Passage of the Members of Parliament Staff Act (1984) (the MoPS Act) and political management reforms to make the public service more responsive were decisive. The MoPS Act resolved some of the ambiguities and tensions about public servants’ involvement in partisan activities while seconded to ministerial offices.
Hawke’s P.M.O. was very much a reflection of the leader. As Prime Minister he encouraged an open office, welcoming frank advice and a diversity of views. He fostered good relationships with the Head of PM&C, Mike Codd and the senior public service who became partners in Labor’s agenda for economic and social reform, and reform of the public service.
Hawke was disciplined with his time and efficient with his paperwork; he liked order, structure and process. This, and the sense of purpose that characterised Hawke’s government, bred strong staff loyalty. His ‘model’, with its emphasis on due process, consultation with Cabinet colleagues and good relationships with the public service, is often cited as an exemplar.
In 1988, the strenuous parliament relocated from its temporary accommodation to the new Parliament house on Capital Hill. Many lamented the shift, noting the physical space restrictions on the old building promoted better relationships between ministers and other parliamentarians, with the public service and the media.
The collaborative and complementary relationship that existed between Hawke’s office and the public service was challenged by this altered ‘geography of influence’. The intimacy of the old building was lost; with security cards required to access the ministerial wing, there was greater formality gaining access to the prime minister and his staff.
For the chief of staff these arrangements made regulating access to the Prime Minister much easier. There were other benefits: quite simply the new building was a better a working environment for the Prime Minister's staff. The increase in space made it possible to appoint more specialists and to provide secretarial and administrative support to alleviate the demands on senior staff.
The growth in staff numbers more generally, but particularly in the P.M.O. expanded the coordination challenges increased, as did the leadership and management responsibilities of the chief of staff. As head of the P.M.O., the CoS now also assumed responsibility for personnel management and performance across government.
- Graham Evans
Name: Graham Evans AO
DoB: 22 January, 1943.
Age at Appointment: 40
Dates of Service: 1983 – 86.
Number of Staff in PMO: 16
Education: BA (Hons), MA University of Melbourne, M International Policy, Johns Hopkins University.
Previous Experience: Public Servant (Treasury), Diplomat (DFAT).
Post CoS Career: Departmental Secretary; Vice President of External Affairs, BHP Billiton; Chair, Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission.
- David ‘Sandy’ Holloway
Name: David ‘Sandy’ Holloway
DoB: 19 November, 1947.
Age at Appointment: 41
Dates of Service: 1988 – 90.
Number of Staff in PMO: 17
Education: BA (Hons), University of Sydney.
Previous Experience: Diplomat (DFAT), Public Servant (PM & C).
Post CoS Career: Deputy Secretary (PM & C); Departmental Secretary (DIST & DEETYA); CEO, Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG); Consultant; Special Envoy (Kokoda and Whale Conservation).
-
1983 - 1991
In tandem
Labor carefully planned its transition to government in 1983. In Opposition, it extensively analysed the Whitlam government’s failings. It worked hard to prove it was fit to govern.
Hawke believed many of the issues the Whitlam government had encountered were a consequence of its poor relationships with the public service. Accordingly, he insisted an experienced public servant would lead his P.M.O.. All four Hawke CoS had significant public service experience; all later became departmental secretaries.
Hawke’s model was strongly premised on harnessing the complementary skills and capacities of the P.M.O. with the skills and expertise of the public service. He made clear he did not want to party political advice from the public servants in his office. He looked to them to ensure he received effective and balanced support, and that he received information and advice from the widest possible variety of sources.
The job of PM’s chief of staff evolved considerably under the Hawke government. Passage of the Members of Parliament Staff Act (1984) (the MoPS Act) and political management reforms to make the public service more responsive were decisive. The MoPS Act resolved some of the ambiguities and tensions about public servants’ involvement in partisan activities while seconded to ministerial offices.
Hawke’s P.M.O. was very much a reflection of the leader. As Prime Minister he encouraged an open office, welcoming frank advice and a diversity of views. He fostered good relationships with the Head of PM&C, Mike Codd and the senior public service who became partners in Labor’s agenda for economic and social reform, and reform of the public service.
Hawke was disciplined with his time and efficient with his paperwork; he liked order, structure and process. This, and the sense of purpose that characterised Hawke’s government, bred strong staff loyalty. His ‘model’, with its emphasis on due process, consultation with Cabinet colleagues and good relationships with the public service, is often cited as an exemplar.
In 1988, the strenuous parliament relocated from its temporary accommodation to the new Parliament house on Capital Hill. Many lamented the shift, noting the physical space restrictions on the old building promoted better relationships between ministers and other parliamentarians, with the public service and the media.
The collaborative and complementary relationship that existed between Hawke’s office and the public service was challenged by this altered ‘geography of influence’. The intimacy of the old building was lost; with security cards required to access the ministerial wing, there was greater formality gaining access to the prime minister and his staff.
For the chief of staff these arrangements made regulating access to the Prime Minister much easier. There were other benefits: quite simply the new building was a better a working environment for the Prime Minister's staff. The increase in space made it possible to appoint more specialists and to provide secretarial and administrative support to alleviate the demands on senior staff.
The growth in staff numbers more generally, but particularly in the P.M.O. expanded the coordination challenges increased, as did the leadership and management responsibilities of the chief of staff. As head of the P.M.O., the CoS now also assumed responsibility for personnel management and performance across government.
- Graham Evans
Name: Graham Evans AO
DoB: 22 January, 1943.
Age at Appointment: 40
Dates of Service: 1983 – 86.
Number of Staff in PMO: 16
Education: BA (Hons), MA University of Melbourne, M International Policy, Johns Hopkins University.
Previous Experience: Public Servant (Treasury), Diplomat (DFAT).
Post CoS Career: Departmental Secretary; Vice President of External Affairs, BHP Billiton; Chair, Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission.
- David ‘Sandy’ Holloway
Name: David ‘Sandy’ Holloway
DoB: 19 November, 1947.
Age at Appointment: 41
Dates of Service: 1988 – 90.
Number of Staff in PMO: 17
Education: BA (Hons), University of Sydney.
Previous Experience: Diplomat (DFAT), Public Servant (PM & C).
Post CoS Career: Deputy Secretary (PM & C); Departmental Secretary (DIST & DEETYA); CEO, Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG); Consultant; Special Envoy (Kokoda and Whale Conservation).
-
1983 - 1991
In tandem
Labor carefully planned its transition to government in 1983. In Opposition, it extensively analysed the Whitlam government’s failings. It worked hard to prove it was fit to govern.
Hawke believed many of the issues the Whitlam government had encountered were a consequence of its poor relationships with the public service. Accordingly, he insisted an experienced public servant would lead his P.M.O.. All four Hawke CoS had significant public service experience; all later became departmental secretaries.
Hawke’s model was strongly premised on harnessing the complementary skills and capacities of the P.M.O. with the skills and expertise of the public service. He made clear he did not want to party political advice from the public servants in his office. He looked to them to ensure he received effective and balanced support, and that he received information and advice from the widest possible variety of sources.
The job of PM’s chief of staff evolved considerably under the Hawke government. Passage of the Members of Parliament Staff Act (1984) (the MoPS Act) and political management reforms to make the public service more responsive were decisive. The MoPS Act resolved some of the ambiguities and tensions about public servants’ involvement in partisan activities while seconded to ministerial offices.
Hawke’s P.M.O. was very much a reflection of the leader. As Prime Minister he encouraged an open office, welcoming frank advice and a diversity of views. He fostered good relationships with the Head of PM&C, Mike Codd and the senior public service who became partners in Labor’s agenda for economic and social reform, and reform of the public service.
Hawke was disciplined with his time and efficient with his paperwork; he liked order, structure and process. This, and the sense of purpose that characterised Hawke’s government, bred strong staff loyalty. His ‘model’, with its emphasis on due process, consultation with Cabinet colleagues and good relationships with the public service, is often cited as an exemplar.
In 1988, the strenuous parliament relocated from its temporary accommodation to the new Parliament house on Capital Hill. Many lamented the shift, noting the physical space restrictions on the old building promoted better relationships between ministers and other parliamentarians, with the public service and the media.
The collaborative and complementary relationship that existed between Hawke’s office and the public service was challenged by this altered ‘geography of influence’. The intimacy of the old building was lost; with security cards required to access the ministerial wing, there was greater formality gaining access to the prime minister and his staff.
For the chief of staff these arrangements made regulating access to the Prime Minister much easier. There were other benefits: quite simply the new building was a better a working environment for the Prime Minister's staff. The increase in space made it possible to appoint more specialists and to provide secretarial and administrative support to alleviate the demands on senior staff.
The growth in staff numbers more generally, but particularly in the P.M.O. expanded the coordination challenges increased, as did the leadership and management responsibilities of the chief of staff. As head of the P.M.O., the CoS now also assumed responsibility for personnel management and performance across government.
- Graham Evans
Name: Graham Evans AO
DoB: 22 January, 1943.
Age at Appointment: 40
Dates of Service: 1983 – 86.
Number of Staff in PMO: 16
Education: BA (Hons), MA University of Melbourne, M International Policy, Johns Hopkins University.
Previous Experience: Public Servant (Treasury), Diplomat (DFAT).
Post CoS Career: Departmental Secretary; Vice President of External Affairs, BHP Billiton; Chair, Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission.
- David ‘Sandy’ Holloway
Name: David ‘Sandy’ Holloway
DoB: 19 November, 1947.
Age at Appointment: 41
Dates of Service: 1988 – 90.
Number of Staff in PMO: 17
Education: BA (Hons), University of Sydney.
Previous Experience: Diplomat (DFAT), Public Servant (PM & C).
Post CoS Career: Deputy Secretary (PM & C); Departmental Secretary (DIST & DEETYA); CEO, Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG); Consultant; Special Envoy (Kokoda and Whale Conservation).
-
Stage 5
Centralised Coordination
Stage 5
Centralised Coordination
Stage 5
Centralised Coordination
Stage 5
Centralised Coordination
1991 - 1996
Centralised Coordination
From the early years of the Labor government, Paul Keating was one of its most senior figures, second only to the Prime Minister himself. Until leadership tension spilled over between them during 1991, Hawke and Keating had been the ideal political tandem. Their partnership underpinned Labor’s unprecedented electoral and policy success. When Keating became prime minister in December 1991, he inherited a government in crisis. It was desperate unpopular and lacking direction.
Keating’s more personal and centralist approach to leadership was a marked contrast to Hawke’s consultative and consensus-based style. Ministers criticised Keating for his failure to consult, his unwillingness to develop and observe ‘proper’ Cabinet process. Colleagues and senior officials resented his tendency to concentrate policy initiation and decision-making within a powerful and progressively more insular PMO and to delegate authority to senior staff, with whom he enjoyed close trusting relationships.
Keating's term in office marked an important shift in the work of the chief staff. It saw the emergence of the present-day CoS and a large and specialised PMO. The PPS tradition was supplanted by a CoS who was personally appointed and had a far broader remit in policy coordination and political management.
While in part this reflected Keating’s style, the causes were more complex. They reflected changes in the broader context of governing: the emergence of the 24-hour news cycle; globalization; fragmentation associated with the rise of network governance and so on.
- Dr Don Russell
Name: Dr Don Russell
Dates of Service: 1991 -93, 1995 – 96.
Number of Staff in PMO: 30-33
Education: BEc (Hons), Flinders; MEc, ANU; PhD, LSE; CFA.
Previous Experience: Public Servant (Treasury); Advisor to the Treasurer and Prime Minister.
Post CoS Career: Ambassador to Washington; Golbal Asset Management/Investment Strategist; Departmental Secretary (DIISRTE).
- Dr Allan Hawke
Name: Dr Allan Hawke, AC
DoB: 18 February, 1948.
Age at Appointment: 45
Dates of Service: 1993 – 94
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: BSc (Hons), ANU; PhD., ANU.
Previous Experience: Public Servant, Deputy Secretary (DoD),
Post CoS Career: Deputy Secretary (PM & C), Departmental Secretary (DVA, DTRS and DoD); High Commissioner to NZ; Chancellor, ANU; Consultant.
- Geoff Walsh
Name: Geoff Walsh, AO
DoB: 6 January, 1953
Age at Appointment: 41
Dates of Service: 1994 – 95
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: BA, LaTrobe.
Previous Experience: Journalist; Press Secretary; Civil Servant (ILO); Special Adviser (PMO); Public Servant (DFAT).
Post CoS Career: Consul-General (Hong Kong) and State Director (DFAT); National Secretary, ALP; Consultant; Chief of Staff to Premiers of Victoria; Director, Public Affairs, BHP Billiton.
1991 - 1996
Centralised Coordination
From the early years of the Labor government, Paul Keating was one of its most senior figures, second only to the Prime Minister himself. Until leadership tension spilled over between them during 1991, Hawke and Keating had been the ideal political tandem. Their partnership underpinned Labor’s unprecedented electoral and policy success. When Keating became prime minister in December 1991, he inherited a government in crisis. It was desperate unpopular and lacking direction.
Keating’s more personal and centralist approach to leadership was a marked contrast to Hawke’s consultative and consensus-based style. Ministers criticised Keating for his failure to consult, his unwillingness to develop and observe ‘proper’ Cabinet process. Colleagues and senior officials resented his tendency to concentrate policy initiation and decision-making within a powerful and progressively more insular PMO and to delegate authority to senior staff, with whom he enjoyed close trusting relationships.
Keating's term in office marked an important shift in the work of the chief staff. It saw the emergence of the present-day CoS and a large and specialised PMO. The PPS tradition was supplanted by a CoS who was personally appointed and had a far broader remit in policy coordination and political management.
While in part this reflected Keating’s style, the causes were more complex. They reflected changes in the broader context of governing: the emergence of the 24-hour news cycle; globalization; fragmentation associated with the rise of network governance and so on.
- Dr Don Russell
Name: Dr Don Russell
Dates of Service: 1991 -93, 1995 – 96.
Number of Staff in PMO: 30-33
Education: BEc (Hons), Flinders; MEc, ANU; PhD, LSE; CFA.
Previous Experience: Public Servant (Treasury); Advisor to the Treasurer and Prime Minister.
Post CoS Career: Ambassador to Washington; Golbal Asset Management/Investment Strategist; Departmental Secretary (DIISRTE).
- Dr Allan Hawke
Name: Dr Allan Hawke, AC
DoB: 18 February, 1948.
Age at Appointment: 45
Dates of Service: 1993 – 94
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: BSc (Hons), ANU; PhD., ANU.
Previous Experience: Public Servant, Deputy Secretary (DoD),
Post CoS Career: Deputy Secretary (PM & C), Departmental Secretary (DVA, DTRS and DoD); High Commissioner to NZ; Chancellor, ANU; Consultant.
- Geoff Walsh
Name: Geoff Walsh, AO
DoB: 6 January, 1953
Age at Appointment: 41
Dates of Service: 1994 – 95
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: BA, LaTrobe.
Previous Experience: Journalist; Press Secretary; Civil Servant (ILO); Special Adviser (PMO); Public Servant (DFAT).
Post CoS Career: Consul-General (Hong Kong) and State Director (DFAT); National Secretary, ALP; Consultant; Chief of Staff to Premiers of Victoria; Director, Public Affairs, BHP Billiton.
1991 - 1996
Centralised Coordination
From the early years of the Labor government, Paul Keating was one of its most senior figures, second only to the Prime Minister himself. Until leadership tension spilled over between them during 1991, Hawke and Keating had been the ideal political tandem. Their partnership underpinned Labor’s unprecedented electoral and policy success. When Keating became prime minister in December 1991, he inherited a government in crisis. It was desperate unpopular and lacking direction.
Keating’s more personal and centralist approach to leadership was a marked contrast to Hawke’s consultative and consensus-based style. Ministers criticised Keating for his failure to consult, his unwillingness to develop and observe ‘proper’ Cabinet process. Colleagues and senior officials resented his tendency to concentrate policy initiation and decision-making within a powerful and progressively more insular PMO and to delegate authority to senior staff, with whom he enjoyed close trusting relationships.
Keating's term in office marked an important shift in the work of the chief staff. It saw the emergence of the present-day CoS and a large and specialised PMO. The PPS tradition was supplanted by a CoS who was personally appointed and had a far broader remit in policy coordination and political management.
While in part this reflected Keating’s style, the causes were more complex. They reflected changes in the broader context of governing: the emergence of the 24-hour news cycle; globalization; fragmentation associated with the rise of network governance and so on.
- Dr Don Russell
Name: Dr Don Russell
Dates of Service: 1991 -93, 1995 – 96.
Number of Staff in PMO: 30-33
Education: BEc (Hons), Flinders; MEc, ANU; PhD, LSE; CFA.
Previous Experience: Public Servant (Treasury); Advisor to the Treasurer and Prime Minister.
Post CoS Career: Ambassador to Washington; Golbal Asset Management/Investment Strategist; Departmental Secretary (DIISRTE).
- Dr Allan Hawke
Name: Dr Allan Hawke, AC
DoB: 18 February, 1948.
Age at Appointment: 45
Dates of Service: 1993 – 94
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: BSc (Hons), ANU; PhD., ANU.
Previous Experience: Public Servant, Deputy Secretary (DoD),
Post CoS Career: Deputy Secretary (PM & C), Departmental Secretary (DVA, DTRS and DoD); High Commissioner to NZ; Chancellor, ANU; Consultant.
- Geoff Walsh
Name: Geoff Walsh, AO
DoB: 6 January, 1953
Age at Appointment: 41
Dates of Service: 1994 – 95
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: BA, LaTrobe.
Previous Experience: Journalist; Press Secretary; Civil Servant (ILO); Special Adviser (PMO); Public Servant (DFAT).
Post CoS Career: Consul-General (Hong Kong) and State Director (DFAT); National Secretary, ALP; Consultant; Chief of Staff to Premiers of Victoria; Director, Public Affairs, BHP Billiton.
1991 - 1996
Centralised Coordination
From the early years of the Labor government, Paul Keating was one of its most senior figures, second only to the Prime Minister himself. Until leadership tension spilled over between them during 1991, Hawke and Keating had been the ideal political tandem. Their partnership underpinned Labor’s unprecedented electoral and policy success. When Keating became prime minister in December 1991, he inherited a government in crisis. It was desperate unpopular and lacking direction.
Keating’s more personal and centralist approach to leadership was a marked contrast to Hawke’s consultative and consensus-based style. Ministers criticised Keating for his failure to consult, his unwillingness to develop and observe ‘proper’ Cabinet process. Colleagues and senior officials resented his tendency to concentrate policy initiation and decision-making within a powerful and progressively more insular PMO and to delegate authority to senior staff, with whom he enjoyed close trusting relationships.
Keating's term in office marked an important shift in the work of the chief staff. It saw the emergence of the present-day CoS and a large and specialised PMO. The PPS tradition was supplanted by a CoS who was personally appointed and had a far broader remit in policy coordination and political management.
While in part this reflected Keating’s style, the causes were more complex. They reflected changes in the broader context of governing: the emergence of the 24-hour news cycle; globalization; fragmentation associated with the rise of network governance and so on.
- Dr Don Russell
Name: Dr Don Russell
Dates of Service: 1991 -93, 1995 – 96.
Number of Staff in PMO: 30-33
Education: BEc (Hons), Flinders; MEc, ANU; PhD, LSE; CFA.
Previous Experience: Public Servant (Treasury); Advisor to the Treasurer and Prime Minister.
Post CoS Career: Ambassador to Washington; Golbal Asset Management/Investment Strategist; Departmental Secretary (DIISRTE).
- Dr Allan Hawke
Name: Dr Allan Hawke, AC
DoB: 18 February, 1948.
Age at Appointment: 45
Dates of Service: 1993 – 94
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: BSc (Hons), ANU; PhD., ANU.
Previous Experience: Public Servant, Deputy Secretary (DoD),
Post CoS Career: Deputy Secretary (PM & C), Departmental Secretary (DVA, DTRS and DoD); High Commissioner to NZ; Chancellor, ANU; Consultant.
- Geoff Walsh
Name: Geoff Walsh, AO
DoB: 6 January, 1953
Age at Appointment: 41
Dates of Service: 1994 – 95
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: BA, LaTrobe.
Previous Experience: Journalist; Press Secretary; Civil Servant (ILO); Special Adviser (PMO); Public Servant (DFAT).
Post CoS Career: Consul-General (Hong Kong) and State Director (DFAT); National Secretary, ALP; Consultant; Chief of Staff to Premiers of Victoria; Director, Public Affairs, BHP Billiton.
Stage 6
The Triumph of the Political
Stage 6
The Triumph of the Political
Stage 6
The Triumph of the Political
Stage 6
The Triumph of the Political
1996 - 2007
The Triumph of the Political
When John Howard became Prime Minister in March 1996, he inherited an advisory system in which the institutional resources available to the leader had been significantly enhanced. Ministerial staff had become much more significant actors than when Howard was a minister in the Fraser government.
Howard came to office with strong ideas about how he wanted to run his government. He proposed reforms to ensure Cabinet could function effectively in setting strategic direction and ensuring adherence to its policy priorities. During its years in Opposition, the Liberal Party devoted much time and effort to developing a cadre of professional, politically attuned and media savvy personal staff. It committed to greater reliance on these staff when next in government.
The PM’s decision to sack six departmental secretaries – in what became known as ‘the night of the long knives’ stamped his authority on a public service that the Coalition considered had become ‘too close’ to Labor. He established the Cabinet Policy Unit (CPU), a small unit, collocated with the PMO and led by a political staffer, which took responsibility for strategy and longer-term policy. This gave Howard’s CoS increased capacity to focus on coordination, day-to-day political management and supporting the prime minister.
Arthur Sinodinos’ appointment as CoS in September 1998 brought stability and order to Howard’s PMO after some initial difficulties. Sinodinos held the role for nine years – a period that coincided with the peak of John Howard’s political success. By the end of the Howard era, PM’s CoS had become more public figures, closely associated with prime ministerial effectiveness and success.
- Nicole Feely
Name: Nicole Feely
DoB: 8 March, 1961
Age at Appointment: 35
Dates of Service: 1996 – 97
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: LLB/BComm, University of Melbourne.
Previous Experience: Solicitor; Barrister, Victorian Bar; Lecturer; Advocate; Policy Advisor and Media Liaison for Shadow Industrial Relations Representative.
Post CoS Career: General Manager, SOCOG; CEO, VECCI; Director, Phillip Morris; CEO, St. Vincent’s Hospital; South Metropolitan Area Health Service, WA.
- Grahame Morris
Name: Grahame Morris
DoB: 9 August, 1951
Age at Appointment: 46
Dates of Service: 1997 (4 months)
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: HSC; Journalism Cadetship.
Previous Experience: Journalist; Public Relations Manager; Press Secretary; CoS (Leader of the Opposition); Political Adviser.
Post CoS Career: Strategic Policy Director, News Ltd; CDO, Jackson Wells Morris; Chairman, PriceWaterhouseCoopers; Consultant.
- Arthur Sinodinos
Name: Arthur Sinodinos
DoB: 25 February, 1957
Age at Appointment: 40
Dates of Service: 1997 – 2006
Number of Staff in PMO: 37 - 41
Education: BCom (Hons), Newcastle.
Previous Experience: Political Adviser; State Director, Liberal Party, WA, SA and NSW; Campaign Manager, Liberal Party Secretariat, CoS to the Attorney-General; Principal Private Secretary, Office of the Prime Minister.
Post CoS Career: State Director, Liberal Party of Australia; Director-General, Cabinet Office (VIC), CoS, Premiers of Victoria.
-
Who is Dr Killer?
Dr Graeme Killer AO is Surgeon General for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. He has been the personal physician of Australian Prime Ministers since 1991.
1996 - 2007
The Triumph of the Political
When John Howard became Prime Minister in March 1996, he inherited an advisory system in which the institutional resources available to the leader had been significantly enhanced. Ministerial staff had become much more significant actors than when Howard was a minister in the Fraser government.
Howard came to office with strong ideas about how he wanted to run his government. He proposed reforms to ensure Cabinet could function effectively in setting strategic direction and ensuring adherence to its policy priorities. During its years in Opposition, the Liberal Party devoted much time and effort to developing a cadre of professional, politically attuned and media savvy personal staff. It committed to greater reliance on these staff when next in government.
The PM’s decision to sack six departmental secretaries – in what became known as ‘the night of the long knives’ stamped his authority on a public service that the Coalition considered had become ‘too close’ to Labor. He established the Cabinet Policy Unit (CPU), a small unit, collocated with the PMO and led by a political staffer, which took responsibility for strategy and longer-term policy. This gave Howard’s CoS increased capacity to focus on coordination, day-to-day political management and supporting the prime minister.
Arthur Sinodinos’ appointment as CoS in September 1998 brought stability and order to Howard’s PMO after some initial difficulties. Sinodinos held the role for nine years – a period that coincided with the peak of John Howard’s political success. By the end of the Howard era, PM’s CoS had become more public figures, closely associated with prime ministerial effectiveness and success.
- Nicole Feely
Name: Nicole Feely
DoB: 8 March, 1961
Age at Appointment: 35
Dates of Service: 1996 – 97
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: LLB/BComm, University of Melbourne.
Previous Experience: Solicitor; Barrister, Victorian Bar; Lecturer; Advocate; Policy Advisor and Media Liaison for Shadow Industrial Relations Representative.
Post CoS Career: General Manager, SOCOG; CEO, VECCI; Director, Phillip Morris; CEO, St. Vincent’s Hospital; South Metropolitan Area Health Service, WA.
- Grahame Morris
Name: Grahame Morris
DoB: 9 August, 1951
Age at Appointment: 46
Dates of Service: 1997 (4 months)
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: HSC; Journalism Cadetship.
Previous Experience: Journalist; Public Relations Manager; Press Secretary; CoS (Leader of the Opposition); Political Adviser.
Post CoS Career: Strategic Policy Director, News Ltd; CDO, Jackson Wells Morris; Chairman, PriceWaterhouseCoopers; Consultant.
- Arthur Sinodinos
Name: Arthur Sinodinos
DoB: 25 February, 1957
Age at Appointment: 40
Dates of Service: 1997 – 2006
Number of Staff in PMO: 37 - 41
Education: BCom (Hons), Newcastle.
Previous Experience: Political Adviser; State Director, Liberal Party, WA, SA and NSW; Campaign Manager, Liberal Party Secretariat, CoS to the Attorney-General; Principal Private Secretary, Office of the Prime Minister.
Post CoS Career: State Director, Liberal Party of Australia; Director-General, Cabinet Office (VIC), CoS, Premiers of Victoria.
-
Who is Dr Killer?
Dr Graeme Killer AO is Surgeon General for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. He has been the personal physician of Australian Prime Ministers since 1991.
1996 - 2007
The Triumph of the Political
When John Howard became Prime Minister in March 1996, he inherited an advisory system in which the institutional resources available to the leader had been significantly enhanced. Ministerial staff had become much more significant actors than when Howard was a minister in the Fraser government.
Howard came to office with strong ideas about how he wanted to run his government. He proposed reforms to ensure Cabinet could function effectively in setting strategic direction and ensuring adherence to its policy priorities. During its years in Opposition, the Liberal Party devoted much time and effort to developing a cadre of professional, politically attuned and media savvy personal staff. It committed to greater reliance on these staff when next in government.
The PM’s decision to sack six departmental secretaries – in what became known as ‘the night of the long knives’ stamped his authority on a public service that the Coalition considered had become ‘too close’ to Labor. He established the Cabinet Policy Unit (CPU), a small unit, collocated with the PMO and led by a political staffer, which took responsibility for strategy and longer-term policy. This gave Howard’s CoS increased capacity to focus on coordination, day-to-day political management and supporting the prime minister.
Arthur Sinodinos’ appointment as CoS in September 1998 brought stability and order to Howard’s PMO after some initial difficulties. Sinodinos held the role for nine years – a period that coincided with the peak of John Howard’s political success. By the end of the Howard era, PM’s CoS had become more public figures, closely associated with prime ministerial effectiveness and success.
- Nicole Feely
Name: Nicole Feely
DoB: 8 March, 1961
Age at Appointment: 35
Dates of Service: 1996 – 97
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: LLB/BComm, University of Melbourne.
Previous Experience: Solicitor; Barrister, Victorian Bar; Lecturer; Advocate; Policy Advisor and Media Liaison for Shadow Industrial Relations Representative.
Post CoS Career: General Manager, SOCOG; CEO, VECCI; Director, Phillip Morris; CEO, St. Vincent’s Hospital; South Metropolitan Area Health Service, WA.
- Grahame Morris
Name: Grahame Morris
DoB: 9 August, 1951
Age at Appointment: 46
Dates of Service: 1997 (4 months)
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: HSC; Journalism Cadetship.
Previous Experience: Journalist; Public Relations Manager; Press Secretary; CoS (Leader of the Opposition); Political Adviser.
Post CoS Career: Strategic Policy Director, News Ltd; CDO, Jackson Wells Morris; Chairman, PriceWaterhouseCoopers; Consultant.
- Arthur Sinodinos
Name: Arthur Sinodinos
DoB: 25 February, 1957
Age at Appointment: 40
Dates of Service: 1997 – 2006
Number of Staff in PMO: 37 - 41
Education: BCom (Hons), Newcastle.
Previous Experience: Political Adviser; State Director, Liberal Party, WA, SA and NSW; Campaign Manager, Liberal Party Secretariat, CoS to the Attorney-General; Principal Private Secretary, Office of the Prime Minister.
Post CoS Career: State Director, Liberal Party of Australia; Director-General, Cabinet Office (VIC), CoS, Premiers of Victoria.
-
Who is Dr Killer?
Dr Graeme Killer AO is Surgeon General for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. He has been the personal physician of Australian Prime Ministers since 1991.
1996 - 2007
The Triumph of the Political
When John Howard became Prime Minister in March 1996, he inherited an advisory system in which the institutional resources available to the leader had been significantly enhanced. Ministerial staff had become much more significant actors than when Howard was a minister in the Fraser government.
Howard came to office with strong ideas about how he wanted to run his government. He proposed reforms to ensure Cabinet could function effectively in setting strategic direction and ensuring adherence to its policy priorities. During its years in Opposition, the Liberal Party devoted much time and effort to developing a cadre of professional, politically attuned and media savvy personal staff. It committed to greater reliance on these staff when next in government.
The PM’s decision to sack six departmental secretaries – in what became known as ‘the night of the long knives’ stamped his authority on a public service that the Coalition considered had become ‘too close’ to Labor. He established the Cabinet Policy Unit (CPU), a small unit, collocated with the PMO and led by a political staffer, which took responsibility for strategy and longer-term policy. This gave Howard’s CoS increased capacity to focus on coordination, day-to-day political management and supporting the prime minister.
Arthur Sinodinos’ appointment as CoS in September 1998 brought stability and order to Howard’s PMO after some initial difficulties. Sinodinos held the role for nine years – a period that coincided with the peak of John Howard’s political success. By the end of the Howard era, PM’s CoS had become more public figures, closely associated with prime ministerial effectiveness and success.
- Nicole Feely
Name: Nicole Feely
DoB: 8 March, 1961
Age at Appointment: 35
Dates of Service: 1996 – 97
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: LLB/BComm, University of Melbourne.
Previous Experience: Solicitor; Barrister, Victorian Bar; Lecturer; Advocate; Policy Advisor and Media Liaison for Shadow Industrial Relations Representative.
Post CoS Career: General Manager, SOCOG; CEO, VECCI; Director, Phillip Morris; CEO, St. Vincent’s Hospital; South Metropolitan Area Health Service, WA.
- Grahame Morris
Name: Grahame Morris
DoB: 9 August, 1951
Age at Appointment: 46
Dates of Service: 1997 (4 months)
Number of Staff in PMO: 30
Education: HSC; Journalism Cadetship.
Previous Experience: Journalist; Public Relations Manager; Press Secretary; CoS (Leader of the Opposition); Political Adviser.
Post CoS Career: Strategic Policy Director, News Ltd; CDO, Jackson Wells Morris; Chairman, PriceWaterhouseCoopers; Consultant.
- Arthur Sinodinos
Name: Arthur Sinodinos
DoB: 25 February, 1957
Age at Appointment: 40
Dates of Service: 1997 – 2006
Number of Staff in PMO: 37 - 41
Education: BCom (Hons), Newcastle.
Previous Experience: Political Adviser; State Director, Liberal Party, WA, SA and NSW; Campaign Manager, Liberal Party Secretariat, CoS to the Attorney-General; Principal Private Secretary, Office of the Prime Minister.
Post CoS Career: State Director, Liberal Party of Australia; Director-General, Cabinet Office (VIC), CoS, Premiers of Victoria.
-
Who is Dr Killer?
Dr Graeme Killer AO is Surgeon General for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. He has been the personal physician of Australian Prime Ministers since 1991.
2007 - 2010
Extreme Personality
Much has been written about Kevin Rudd’s tumultuous period as Prime Minister. The experience continues to be interpreted and reinterpreted through the bitter partisan divisions that tore apart the previously successful partnership between Rudd and his Deputy, Julia Gillard, which underpinned Labor’s election victory in 2007 and its early period in government.
Rudd had two CoS in his twenty months in the PMO. Initially David Epstein, a veteran of the Hawke and Keating governments who had joined Rudd’s office in Opposition to help smooth the transition to government, served as CoS. He, and many other experienced senior staff left Rudd’s office during 2008 and 2009, reportedly exhausted by Rudd’s unrelenting demands and frustrated at their inability to influence the PM.
Epstein’s replacement was Alister Jordan, who had worked with Rudd in Opposition and was instrumental to his election as ALP Leader in December 2006 and emphatic victory at the December 2007 election. Jordan’s appointment was widely criticized – he was derided for his youth, his relative inexperience and lack of Canberra networks. But as Jordan’s supporters rightly point out, he had a range of skills including those that are critical for any Chief of Staff: the ability to work with and foster a relationship of trust with the Prime Minister.
Rudd’s office, the public service and member of his Cabinet all experienced the effects of a prime minister whose personality has been described as extreme. The Rudd case illustrates a much broader point: that the practices of prime ministerial advisers – both partisan and official, are shaped by the pressure of events and the working styles and personalities of prime ministers. The CoS and PMO can help prime ministers with whatever they want to do and with how to do it. What they cannot do is stand in for prime ministers who do not know what they want to do or how to achieve it.
- David Epstein
Name: David Epstein
DoB: 9 January, 1963
Age at Appointment: 44
Dates of Service: 2007 – 08
Number of Staff in PMO: 43
Education: BA, ANU.
Previous Experience: Executive Officer; Media Adviser and Policy Officer; Private Secretary to a Minister; Communications Director for ALP National Secretariat; Cos, Leader of the Opposition; Senior Manager, Telecommunications; Director, Government Relations.
Post CoS Career: Executive/VP Qantas, BHP Billiton and Optus.
-
National Apology
-
Kevin Rudd Announces His Retirement
2007 - 2010
Extreme Personality
Much has been written about Kevin Rudd’s tumultuous period as Prime Minister. The experience continues to be interpreted and reinterpreted through the bitter partisan divisions that tore apart the previously successful partnership between Rudd and his Deputy, Julia Gillard, which underpinned Labor’s election victory in 2007 and its early period in government.
Rudd had two CoS in his twenty months in the PMO. Initially David Epstein, a veteran of the Hawke and Keating governments who had joined Rudd’s office in Opposition to help smooth the transition to government, served as CoS. He, and many other experienced senior staff left Rudd’s office during 2008 and 2009, reportedly exhausted by Rudd’s unrelenting demands and frustrated at their inability to influence the PM.
Epstein’s replacement was Alister Jordan, who had worked with Rudd in Opposition and was instrumental to his election as ALP Leader in December 2006 and emphatic victory at the December 2007 election. Jordan’s appointment was widely criticized – he was derided for his youth, his relative inexperience and lack of Canberra networks. But as Jordan’s supporters rightly point out, he had a range of skills including those that are critical for any Chief of Staff: the ability to work with and foster a relationship of trust with the Prime Minister.
Rudd’s office, the public service and member of his Cabinet all experienced the effects of a prime minister whose personality has been described as extreme. The Rudd case illustrates a much broader point: that the practices of prime ministerial advisers – both partisan and official, are shaped by the pressure of events and the working styles and personalities of prime ministers. The CoS and PMO can help prime ministers with whatever they want to do and with how to do it. What they cannot do is stand in for prime ministers who do not know what they want to do or how to achieve it.
- David Epstein
Name: David Epstein
DoB: 9 January, 1963
Age at Appointment: 44
Dates of Service: 2007 – 08
Number of Staff in PMO: 43
Education: BA, ANU.
Previous Experience: Executive Officer; Media Adviser and Policy Officer; Private Secretary to a Minister; Communications Director for ALP National Secretariat; Cos, Leader of the Opposition; Senior Manager, Telecommunications; Director, Government Relations.
Post CoS Career: Executive/VP Qantas, BHP Billiton and Optus.
-
National Apology
-
Kevin Rudd Announces His Retirement
2007 - 2010
Extreme Personality
Much has been written about Kevin Rudd’s tumultuous period as Prime Minister. The experience continues to be interpreted and reinterpreted through the bitter partisan divisions that tore apart the previously successful partnership between Rudd and his Deputy, Julia Gillard, which underpinned Labor’s election victory in 2007 and its early period in government.
Rudd had two CoS in his twenty months in the PMO. Initially David Epstein, a veteran of the Hawke and Keating governments who had joined Rudd’s office in Opposition to help smooth the transition to government, served as CoS. He, and many other experienced senior staff left Rudd’s office during 2008 and 2009, reportedly exhausted by Rudd’s unrelenting demands and frustrated at their inability to influence the PM.
Epstein’s replacement was Alister Jordan, who had worked with Rudd in Opposition and was instrumental to his election as ALP Leader in December 2006 and emphatic victory at the December 2007 election. Jordan’s appointment was widely criticized – he was derided for his youth, his relative inexperience and lack of Canberra networks. But as Jordan’s supporters rightly point out, he had a range of skills including those that are critical for any Chief of Staff: the ability to work with and foster a relationship of trust with the Prime Minister.
Rudd’s office, the public service and member of his Cabinet all experienced the effects of a prime minister whose personality has been described as extreme. The Rudd case illustrates a much broader point: that the practices of prime ministerial advisers – both partisan and official, are shaped by the pressure of events and the working styles and personalities of prime ministers. The CoS and PMO can help prime ministers with whatever they want to do and with how to do it. What they cannot do is stand in for prime ministers who do not know what they want to do or how to achieve it.
- David Epstein
Name: David Epstein
DoB: 9 January, 1963
Age at Appointment: 44
Dates of Service: 2007 – 08
Number of Staff in PMO: 43
Education: BA, ANU.
Previous Experience: Executive Officer; Media Adviser and Policy Officer; Private Secretary to a Minister; Communications Director for ALP National Secretariat; Cos, Leader of the Opposition; Senior Manager, Telecommunications; Director, Government Relations.
Post CoS Career: Executive/VP Qantas, BHP Billiton and Optus.
-
National Apology
-
Kevin Rudd Announces His Retirement
2007 - 2010
Extreme Personality
Much has been written about Kevin Rudd’s tumultuous period as Prime Minister. The experience continues to be interpreted and reinterpreted through the bitter partisan divisions that tore apart the previously successful partnership between Rudd and his Deputy, Julia Gillard, which underpinned Labor’s election victory in 2007 and its early period in government.
Rudd had two CoS in his twenty months in the PMO. Initially David Epstein, a veteran of the Hawke and Keating governments who had joined Rudd’s office in Opposition to help smooth the transition to government, served as CoS. He, and many other experienced senior staff left Rudd’s office during 2008 and 2009, reportedly exhausted by Rudd’s unrelenting demands and frustrated at their inability to influence the PM.
Epstein’s replacement was Alister Jordan, who had worked with Rudd in Opposition and was instrumental to his election as ALP Leader in December 2006 and emphatic victory at the December 2007 election. Jordan’s appointment was widely criticized – he was derided for his youth, his relative inexperience and lack of Canberra networks. But as Jordan’s supporters rightly point out, he had a range of skills including those that are critical for any Chief of Staff: the ability to work with and foster a relationship of trust with the Prime Minister.
Rudd’s office, the public service and member of his Cabinet all experienced the effects of a prime minister whose personality has been described as extreme. The Rudd case illustrates a much broader point: that the practices of prime ministerial advisers – both partisan and official, are shaped by the pressure of events and the working styles and personalities of prime ministers. The CoS and PMO can help prime ministers with whatever they want to do and with how to do it. What they cannot do is stand in for prime ministers who do not know what they want to do or how to achieve it.
- David Epstein
Name: David Epstein
DoB: 9 January, 1963
Age at Appointment: 44
Dates of Service: 2007 – 08
Number of Staff in PMO: 43
Education: BA, ANU.
Previous Experience: Executive Officer; Media Adviser and Policy Officer; Private Secretary to a Minister; Communications Director for ALP National Secretariat; Cos, Leader of the Opposition; Senior Manager, Telecommunications; Director, Government Relations.
Post CoS Career: Executive/VP Qantas, BHP Billiton and Optus.
-
National Apology
-
Kevin Rudd Announces His Retirement
8 Lessons Learned
8 Lessons Learned
8 Lessons Learned
8 Lessons Learned
8 Lessons Learned
- Know the boss
- Run the office
- Be there tomorrow
- Focus on priorities
- Control the agenda
- Get the right people in the room
- Manage key dependencies
- Preserve institutional memory
8 Lessons Learned
- Know the boss
- Run the office
- Be there tomorrow
- Focus on priorities
- Control the agenda
- Get the right people in the room
- Manage key dependencies
- Preserve institutional memory
8 Lessons Learned
- Know the boss
- Run the office
- Be there tomorrow
- Focus on priorities
- Control the agenda
- Get the right people in the room
- Manage key dependencies
- Preserve institutional memory
8 Lessons Learned
- Know the boss
- Run the office
- Be there tomorrow
- Focus on priorities
- Control the agenda
- Get the right people in the room
- Manage key dependencies
- Preserve institutional memory
Pest Controller, Shock Absorber: Explained
“Pest Controller”: sympathetically listen to members seeking access to the prime minister, support for a politically important initiative or some form of preferment.
“Shock Absorber”: The CoS is the bearer of bad news and also, the person most likely to be on the receiving end of the prime minister’s displeasure – it requires a degree of resilience.
Pest Controller, Shock Absorber: Explained
“Pest Controller”: sympathetically listen to members seeking access to the prime minister, support for a politically important initiative or some form of preferment.
“Shock Absorber”: The CoS is the bearer of bad news and also, the person most likely to be on the receiving end of the prime minister’s displeasure – it requires a degree of resilience.
Pest Controller, Shock Absorber: Explained
“Pest Controller”: sympathetically listen to members seeking access to the prime minister, support for a politically important initiative or some form of preferment.
“Shock Absorber”: The CoS is the bearer of bad news and also, the person most likely to be on the receiving end of the prime minister’s displeasure – it requires a degree of resilience.
Pest Controller, Shock Absorber: Explained
“Pest Controller”: sympathetically listen to members seeking access to the prime minister, support for a politically important initiative or some form of preferment.
“Shock Absorber”: The CoS is the bearer of bad news and also, the person most likely to be on the receiving end of the prime minister’s displeasure – it requires a degree of resilience.
About The Author
Anne Tiernan is an Associate Professor in the Centre for Governance and Public Policy and School of Government and Industrial Relations at Griffith University, Australia.
For more information about the author please visit http://www.annetiernan.com.au/.
About The Author
Anne Tiernan is an Associate Professor in the Centre for Governance and Public Policy and School of Government and Industrial Relations at Griffith University, Australia.
For more information about the author please visit http://www.annetiernan.com.au/.
About The Author
Anne Tiernan is an Associate Professor in the Centre for Governance and Public Policy and School of Government and Industrial Relations at Griffith University, Australia.
For more information about the author please visit http://www.annetiernan.com.au/.
About The Author
Anne Tiernan is an Associate Professor in the Centre for Governance and Public Policy and School of Government and Industrial Relations at Griffith University, Australia.
For more information about the author please visit http://www.annetiernan.com.au/.
Acknowledgements
"Pest Controller and Shock Absorber: 40 years of the Prime Ministers’ Chiefs of Staff" is a collaborative project created with Griffith University ePress.
Anne would like to thank: Chris Boyle, James Boyle, Michael Boyle, Shauna Farquhar, Sarah Lindsay, Darryl Marsh, Brian Short, Helen Rowe, and Rod Rhodes.
Digital Producer: Jules Blakey, Griffith University ePress
Developed by Innovation Projects Team, Learning Futures, Griffith University: Sheila McCarthy, Oleg Estrin, Geoff McIntyre, and Gary Tischer.

Pest Controller, Shock Absorber: 40 years of the Prime Minister's Chiefs of Staff by Anne Tiernan is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Based on a work at http://t.co/WJ4Ru0eZvD.
Acknowledgements
"Pest Controller and Shock Absorber: 40 years of the Prime Ministers’ Chiefs of Staff" is a collaborative project created with Griffith University ePress.
Anne would like to thank: Chris Boyle, James Boyle, Michael Boyle, Shauna Farquhar, Sarah Lindsay, Darryl Marsh, Brian Short, Helen Rowe, and Rod Rhodes.
Digital Producer: Jules Blakey, Griffith University ePress
Developed by Innovation Projects Team, Learning Futures, Griffith University: Sheila McCarthy, Oleg Estrin, Geoff McIntyre, and Gary Tischer.

Pest Controller, Shock Absorber: 40 years of the Prime Minister's Chiefs of Staff by Anne Tiernan is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Based on a work at http://t.co/WJ4Ru0eZvD.
Acknowledgements
"Pest Controller and Shock Absorber: 40 years of the Prime Ministers’ Chiefs of Staff" is a collaborative project created with Griffith University ePress.
Anne would like to thank: Chris Boyle, James Boyle, Michael Boyle, Shauna Farquhar, Sarah Lindsay, Darryl Marsh, Brian Short, Helen Rowe, and Rod Rhodes.
Digital Producer: Jules Blakey, Griffith University ePress
Developed by Innovation Projects Team, Learning Futures, Griffith University: Sheila McCarthy, Oleg Estrin, Geoff McIntyre, and Gary Tischer.

Pest Controller, Shock Absorber: 40 years of the Prime Minister's Chiefs of Staff by Anne Tiernan is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Based on a work at http://t.co/WJ4Ru0eZvD.
Acknowledgements
"Pest Controller and Shock Absorber: 40 years of the Prime Ministers’ Chiefs of Staff" is a collaborative project created with Griffith University ePress.
Anne would like to thank: Chris Boyle, James Boyle, Michael Boyle, Shauna Farquhar, Sarah Lindsay, Darryl Marsh, Brian Short, Helen Rowe, and Rod Rhodes.
Digital Producer: Jules Blakey, Griffith University ePress
Developed by Innovation Projects Team, Learning Futures, Griffith University: Sheila McCarthy, Oleg Estrin, Geoff McIntyre, and Gary Tischer.

Pest Controller, Shock Absorber: 40 years of the Prime Minister's Chiefs of Staff by Anne Tiernan is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Based on a work at http://t.co/WJ4Ru0eZvD.